Vietnam War and the troops of the French

In April 1956, the last French soldiers in Vietnam were evacuated. After 200 years of rule, the French came to the conclusion that controlling Vietnam was an impossible job. (Anderson 2005). The French high command’s blatant rudeness during the mediation process contributed to their failure to secure Vietnamese independence and secure French control over Vietnam. According to this, the French were defeated by a subpar battalion, and the issue raised by this defeat could only be found in the tactics used. There are a couple of crucial things that the United States should have learned both militarily and politically from the French loss to Vietminh in the first Vietnam War from 1946 to 1954. The decisive war between these two militias was called Dien Bien Phu which the French were defeated in a period of two days of the warfare. This warfare happened in early 1954 immediately Vietminh accepted and received assistance from both the Soviet Union and Chinese (Gardner and Gittinger 2004). Once they took to the field, Vietminh had completely outnumbered the French soldiers regarding support forces, troops, workers, supplies, food, trucks, artillery, and ammunition.

The first thing the United States can learn from this is that Vietnam sort partners from whom they could acquire military support. General Navarre made two mistakes which caused him dearly in this battle. First, he misjudged the military capabilities of Vietminh in an ongoing battle. Second, he aggrandized the French’s military prowess once the warfare began. The second thing the United States can learn from these fatal mistakes is that one should not misjudge their enemies’ efficiency during battle and they should not attempt to exaggerate their military prowess in warfare. Since the Geneva Conference was already scheduled for May 1954, General Giap desired to use this battle to make a statement. His plan was to convincingly defeat the French at Dien Bien Phu so that if they went to the conference, he would have the upper hand on the table.

The third thing the United States can learn from these events is that the Vietminh were proficient at political maneuvers. They were aware of what was going around them, and this enabled them to use manipulation to win in particular political situations so that they could accomplish their objectives. When you put into consideration the position Vietminh was in, one can clearly see that this was a matter of life and death for the people in battle and the country. During the battle, they engaged in combat aggressively and ensured they were making steady progress until they had cornered the French.

The fourth clue that the United States can learn from this is that Vietminh was well trained to adapt to the different landscape, weather and climate. This qualified them to be crafty opponents with the ability to adapt to any situation and modify their plans in case of emergency. The Vietminh however used a large number of troops. This enabled them to have a good ratio against the French army and ultimately led them to win the war. When you compare the number of injured people between the Vietminh and the French, one will realize that the French had minor casualties than the Vietminh people. Taking these clues into consideration, the United States should have won the war. What they needed was to revisit the loss of the French in the hands of the Vietnamese people and correct what they did wrong.

References

Anderson, D. L. (2005). The Vietnam War. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gardner, L. C. (2004). The search for peace in Vietnam, 1964-1968. Los Angeles: Texas A&M University Press.