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Prior to the 20th century, the majority of challenges to a nation’s security came from the military forces of its neighbors. However, with the dawn of the twenty-first century came a change in the nature of foreign threats, largely as a result of the unexpected rise of several non-state actors aiming their attacks at various nations. Currently, non-state actors include, among others, pirates on the high seas, drug cartels, and terrorists. These non-state actors attack create bigger hazards than attacks by recognized militaries because they generally attack the nation from within and do not give any warning before doing so. Since they do are not aligned to a particular country, and pose threats to several nations in equal measures, all non-state actor threats cannot be unilaterally addressed as a non-traditional threat to a single country.
Non-state actor threats establish themselves before advancing their activities to particular target nations. They receive funds from a host of unrecognized entities to enrich and arm themselves before becoming a major worry to the countries they target. More so, they push a certain agenda and will fight anyone, or any country that does not conform to their ideology. For instance, the terrorism is based on an ideology that is coined to a particular people, and attack those that reject the ideology. This means that at one moment, they may attack an enemy of their based nation, and on another, attack the host nation and its allies. Some non-state actors can pose a threat to different countries at a given instance, while some may pose a threat to a single nation due to their differences. Due to the non-uniformity to their plans and activities, addressing them as a non-traditional threat to a single country tend to fail.
Countries have their own rules of engagement with their neighbors. They form unions, laws, and relations to ensure that there are no conflicts among them. Furthermore, the United Nations was established to deal with issues threatening the national security of co-existing nations. However, the 21st century’s emergence of several non-state threats derail the efforts by sovereign nations and the United Nations in resolving conflicts arising from their (non-state actors) threats. The emergence of terrorism groups, for example, pose a greater threat to the security of the countries – both close and far – than the armed forces of another country since their attacks are not limited to a particular state. Armed with their demands, these non-state threats terrorize many countries at a time to demand the fulfillment of their demands. Unlike the previous traditional threats, the non-state pose threats to the national security of a wider region.
The 21st Century is coupled with infrastructure development, improved technology, favorable international laws, and many other developments. While these events improve the lives of the people as well as the relations between countries, it has improved means of attacks by the non-threat actors. Non-state hackers, for example, can destabilize the security of target nations without crossing over to that nation. Since the laws concerning cyber activities, for instance, are different in the different countries, they may not be deemed as breaking the law in their own countries. Similarly, terrorists and drug traffickers are free to cross from one nation that supports their activities and fight their enemies; when the support is withdrawn, they seek help from other sources and attack their new targets. These non-state threat actors are not allied to one state, making it impossible to track and counter attack. Moreover, they seek loopholes to explore in many nations; these can be through their laws, relations, or customs.
The difference in interests, laws, and beliefs of one country makes it hard to eliminate non-threat actors. Even a single superpower like the United States cannot eliminate non-state threats completely. They do not have enough access to tackle threats residing from a targeted country since most of the laws and regulations of that particular country may not align with theirs. Pursuing these threats are therefore limited to a particular region; a single state cannot pursue criminals into the countries where their international relations are non-existent. Without Mutual Corporation between different countries, the non-threat actors are free to attack and seek asylum in countries where they are offered protection. With the administration of International Corporation, countries can be able to counter non-state threats fully and pursue them and even eliminate them.
While corporation between countries can be beneficial to all the countries involved in fighting non-state threat actors, problems two main problems may arise from such cooperation. First, it may bring in a previously non-existence threat to the countries intervening in the fight between their country and the non-state threat. For example, if country X decides to offer support to country Y in the fight against maritime pirates, the maritime pirates can choose to start attacking vessels from country X; something they previously did not. Secondly, cooperation between two nations in fighting a non-state threat may lead to the restriction of human rights in both nations. This includes the need to change the laws of the host and assisting nation since the threat will extend to the assisting country. The citizens of the nation that goes ahead to help another country’s fight, sooner begin to feel the heat of the cooperation; the non-state actors begin to launch attacks leading to loss of lives.
In conclusion, non-threat actors are a threat, not only to their host nation but to those that do not support their activities. With the improvement of technology, international relations, and infrastructure, backed with the difference in laws and regulations in different countries, non-threat actors are more mobile and can attack different places at a time. To fight them effectively, nations need to unite and cooperate, formulate laws, and attack these threats united.
Kent V Kendal Visions of Intelligence
Sherman Kent and Willmoore Kendal contributed heavily to the intelligence analysis, though with differing opinions. Kent, recognized as the “father of Intelligence Analysis,” as well as the “founding father of the CIA analytic arm” supported a bright stark line between the policy makers and the analysts so as to ensure the subsequent maintains the analytic objectivity. In the book “Strategic Intelligence,” Kent analyzed the United States Intelligence, reviewing in details the various strategies to effective policy making. On the contrary, Kendall argued that only through close involvement could the analysts bring a meaningful contribution to the policy making process. In his publication “The Function of Intelligence,” Kendal adopted a different perspective that differed with Kent’s assertions on policy and decision making in the United State Intelligence.
Kent, born in 1903, was well educated, actively participated in the World War II. Some of his achievements in the war included the Herculean research efforts of 1942 that supported the Allied Invasion of the North Africa. He was an accomplished historian and analyst, and thus in an excellent position to explore the flaws in the national intelligence. In published doctrine in Strategic Intelligence, Kent compared the outlined the relationship between those producing the intelligence and those consuming it, as “one of the utmost delicacy.” It was not a self-established relationship and thus required great “conscious effort” to maintain, failure to which, the relationship crumbles. That is, the work counted at the desk becomes problematic at the higher level.
Kent outlined that, the policymakers rarely trust the quality and utility of the intelligent makers, and the intelligent makers rarely take responsibility for their assessments. He remarks that the relationship required special handling. In one, the function of the intelligence unit is limited to providing expert knowledge of the external environment, after which the policymakers - expert knowledge in United States Policies - can then formulate new policies. That is, the decision makers need the intelligence unit’s service to make sound policies. In the same manner, the intelligence needs to be objective in providing scholarship; getting close to the policy and the process would undermine the entire purpose of the relationship.
Furthermore, the Kent warned that even though the intelligence comes close enough to policy, operations, and plans to have the most significant guidance, it has to be efficient to ensure it does not lose its objectivity and integrity of judgment. That is, there is a closer greater danger from intelligence being too close to policy, than being far from it. Moreover, he saw the risk of absorption of producers by the consumers might not be the answer to the problems encountered in the capture and analysis of national intelligence.
Kendal grew up in a different background and environment to Kent. Born in 1909, Kent first experience with intelligence analysis was short. Before 1946, he had little information available for him on the intelligence analysis. In his review of Kent’s Strategic Intelligence, Kendall criticized the need to improve the performance of intelligence as well as the overall theory of intelligence. Instead of the generalized theory, Kent called for “an intelligence operation that was built on a conception of research processes in the social sciences.” Since Kendall’s perspective sought to free the intelligence officers from the processes, the waves of documents that would otherwise result from Kent’s perspective would be eliminated. Furthermore, instead of relying on Kent’s method of relaying Intelligence, Kendall perspective encouraged thought. With this, the analysts would only be provided with data that matter, minus the unnecessary out of date traffic and documentation.
While Kendal agreed with Kent on the need for guidance from the policymakers to ensure that the job in the field is done, he viewed the future of the free world as a major factor in the development of American policy. In addition to that, he disagreed with Kent’s reliance on the prediction of future outcomes, and his lack of considering the element of surprise. Instead of predicting, Kendal sees intelligence as influential in determining the policies developed by policymakers. Furthermore, he flawed the producer-to-consumer relation that Kent brought about. Kendal saw this separation of intelligence from domestic affairs as a self-defeating approach. He instead viewed intelligence as a unit that translates the light course of foreign policies.
The differences between Kent and Kendal in their perspectives on intelligence analysis are worth discussing as they bring to turn on the flaws that may result from any particular perspective. Both Kent and Kendal offer differing arguments on the importance of intelligence. In the governmental Intelligence units in the United States may use the intelligence to predict future events or plan for policy changes. Studying the effects and the limitation on both perspectives offers insight on whether to use the intelligence to plan or to predict.
Currently, Kendall’s argument seemed to be practical in the light of constant changes in the intelligence world. Due to that, intelligence out to be used to be more about shaping the future instead of predicting the event. The futures are worth creating, and instead of piling cases of “useless” intelligence, it is important to think about how the intelligence information can affect the present and shape policies to address the issues.
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Buchan, Russell, and Nicholas Tsagourias. “Special Issue: Non-State Actors and Responsibility in Cyberspace: State Responsibility, Individual Criminal Responsibility and Issues of Evidence.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2016): krw017.
Bunker, Robert J., ed. Non-state threats and future wars. Routledge, 2012.
Davis, Jack. “The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949.” Studies in Intelligence 35, no. 2 (1992).
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Hudspeth, David W. Countering the Impact and Influence of Non-State Threats. Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico VA, 2008.
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