The Boston Marathon Bombing

Investigating the Boston Marathon Bombing

On April 15, 2013, two locally made bombs exploded at the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three people, including an 8-year-old child, and injuring over 260 others. Security forces apprehended Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, 19, after a protracted manhunt, but his older brother Tamerlan was killed in a confrontation with security personnel earlier that day (Bluman, 2013, pgs. 1053-1054).

Laxity and Missed Opportunities

The bombing was a sign of laxity on the part of the intelligence community and law enforcement officers and it would have been prevented in the first place had the intelligence agencies utilized the opportunity to detain Tamerlan Tsarnaev a year earlier when he returned from Dagestan (Kredo, 2013).

Also, it’s alleged by anonymous individuals that the perpetrator of the bombing learned how to make bombs from an al-Qaeda affiliated website. Due to this, it is a fact that had the intelligence service been monitoring terror-affiliated websites, they would have easily traced the perpetrator of this bombing and maybe intervened and prevented the incident (“Boston bombing suspects built explosives with help of online Al Qaeda magazine, official says”, 2013).

According to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing-Applying Lessons Learned | ISE Annual Report to the Congress 2014, main security agencies who had previously shared the information about the Boston marathon bombing were the Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI), Homeland Security Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Center for National Counterterrorism. However, these security agencies failed to identify their communication channels that could have resulted prevention of the incident (Kredo, 2013).

Failures in Information Sharing

According to Crassley, C. (2013) report, there are a number of reasons why the intelligence community failed to share the essential information that might have prevented Boston marathon bombing. Key to this reason, assessing the strength of Russian intelligence about Tamerlan Tsarnaev, it was a big mistake for Federal Bureau Investigation to consider and conclude that the Russian tip was unrealistic because they failed to disclose all the information and if they did, the data did not support any form of terrorism (Schmitt, 2014).

In my opinion, this was not justified by the intelligence community because they should have treated Russian tip as reliable information given that the information obtained was by electronic surveillance. Limited information among the security intelligence caught them unaware. These resulted in a lack of adequate investigation by the Federal Bureau Investigation and communication hitch in different security agencies and departments (Crassley, 2013).

There is no enough reason why intelligence agencies relied only on Russian tips, the security agencies should have used advanced technology to investigate further on the provided tip. Finally, the failure of security agencies to generate a detailed indigent steps to avoid any form of terrorism even when the basis of arrest and prosecution of the suspect lacks, the Federal Bureau Investigation failed to utilize its resources to investigate the suspect even though the law protects them against investigating American citizens (“The 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing-Applying Lessons Learned | ISE Annual Report to the Congress 2014”, n.d.).

Miscommunication and Missed Opportunities

Based on the intelligence shared by the Russian agencies, Federal Bureau Investigation of Central Investigation Agencies could have prevented Boston marathon bombing. It is clear that there was miscommunication among the local enforcement agencies even after the CIA had alerted other agencies on the possibilities of Tamerlan Tsarnaev being radicalized. Both CIA and FBI should have cooperated to avoid communication hitch and spelling error of suspects’ name when he traveled to Russia. FBI failure to perform a detailed investigation could have been repositioned had they adhered to alert generated by CIA when Tamerlan Tsarnaev was returning from Russia, this is because his information was shared by the customs and border protection officers guided by the FBI terrorism task force (Kredo, 2013).

Failure of Russian agencies to provide additional information to FBI was a major blow to investigation process of Tamerlan Tsarnaev. However, the local enforcement agencies could have taken the Russian tip seriously and utilize all its resources to investigate the suspect even after closing his file (Bluman, 2013, pgs. 1053-1054).

Improving Law Enforcement Agencies

There is an increasing demand for more advanced information technology by the law enforcement agencies to facilitate their operations and prevent and prevent a terror attack on American soil. In the case of Boston marathon bombing, repositioning law enforcement agencies includes the availability of record management systems which helps in maintenance of agencies’ case histories as well as computer aided dispatch which is essential in maintaining agencies’ call for services and response system (Kredo, 2013).

With the availabilities of these capabilities, Tamerlan Tsarnaev would have been arrested when the Central Intelligence Agency created his alert. In this case, Boston marathon bombing would have been stopped. Furthermore, there is an increased demand to improve channels of sharing essential information and data with all levels of law enforcement departments to ensure they are well updated with the new unfolding or alerts about the suspects (Crassley, 2013; Hollywood, & Winkelman, 2015). Based on this case, had CIA alerted FBI about the Russian tip they had received, they could have reopened Tamerlan Tsarnaev file and possibly arrested him on time.

References

Bluman, E. (2013). Boston Marathon Bombing. Foot & Ankle International, 34(8), 1053-1054. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1071100713495811

Boston bombing suspects built explosives with help of online Al Qaeda magazine, official says. (2013). Fox News. Retrieved 18 April 2017, from http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/04/23/marathon-attack-suspect-communicating-by-writing-sources-say-with-faith-seen-as.html

Crassley, C. (2013). Grassley Statement at FBI Oversight Hearing | Chuck Grassley. Grassley.senate.gov. Retrieved 18 April 2017, from https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-statement-fbi-oversight-hearing-1

History.com Staff. (2014). Boston Marathon Bombings - Facts & Summary - HISTORY.com. HISTORY.com. Retrieved 18 April 2017, from http://www.history.com/topics/boston-marathon-bombings

Hollywood, J., & Winkelman, Z. (2015). Improving Information-Sharing Across Law Enforcement: Why Can’t We Know?. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR645.html.

Kredo, A. (2013). Failure to Communicate. Washington Free Beacon. Retrieved 18 April 2017, from http://freebeacon.com/national-security/failure-to-communicate-2/

Schmitt, M. (2014). Russia Didn’t Share All Details on Boston Bombing Suspect, Report Says. Nytimes.com. Retrieved 18 April 2017, from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/us/russia-failed-to-share-details-on-boston-marathon-bombing-suspect.html

The 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing-Applying Lessons Learned | ISE Annual Report to the Congress 2014. Ise.gov. Retrieved 18 April 2017, from https://www.ise.gov/annual-report/2014/2013-boston-marathon-bombing-applying-lessons-learned