South Sudan - On-going Political Issues

The newest nation in Africa is South Sudan, which declared its independence from Sudan in 2011. More than 50,000 people have died in the country’s terrible civil war, which began six years after it gained independence. Additionally, 1.6 million individuals have been forced to relocate (Johnson, 2014). In July 2013, a battle erupted after President Salva Kiir believed that his former deputy, Riek Machar, was plotting to seize control. A few people viewed the President’s decision to rebuild his government’s top leadership as a power grab following suspicions of a planned coup d’état (Srb, 2014). However, Riek Machar denied the allegations and left the country to start the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement – in-opposition (SPLM-IO) (Jok, 2014). Machar criticised Kiir on high levels of corruption and resolved to challenge him for the country’s leadership. Consequently, an armed conflict exploded in the capital city- Juba between disgruntled soldiers of former vice president (SPLA-IO) and President Kiir’s loyal forces (SPLA).

Moreover, the conflict shiftily escalated into a civil war. In 2016, Kiir appointed Taban Gai as the First Vice President subsequently dividing the rebels. Although both Kiir and Machar were members of the SPLM, they belong from diverse tribes with a past record of conflict. Precisely, Machar stem from Nuer ethnic group while Kiir belong to Dinka group. The conflict was first between Dinka and Nuer groups but it has spread to other ethnic groups in the country (Johnson, 2014). The on-going conflict in South Sudan has escalated because different political figures attempt to use ethnic personalities to meet their own political goals.

Its Brief History

The Nuer and Dinka ethnic groups have a long history of conflicts. They are both pastoralist communities who have contested over water and grazing land for their cattle in the previous decades (Knopf, 2016). The rivalries have occurred in a local setting without leading to significant amount of deaths. The two also represent the largest tribal organizations in South Sudan. In several occasion the relationships between the two tribes has been characterized by cooperation’s and intermarriages (Sørbø, 2014). Normally, cattle thefts are regarded as a livelihood preserving tradition, which permits ethnic groups to restock their herds after deaths during drought. Moreover, during drought period, the both sections migrate to land claimed by different societies that often led to cattle raiding and conflicts (Mamdani, 2016).

Conflict between Machar and Kiir has also deep-rooted history. Although both fought together during the South Sudanese war of independence, in some instances, they also fought against one another. They were both war generals in the SPLA (Knopf, 2016). However, at one point, Machar established a separate army group whose members included his Nuer ethnic kinsmen. In 1991, his forces were accused of masterminding a massacre against the Dinka community in the city of Bor. They only reunited in 2002 when Machar re-joined the SPLM. Reports indicated that tension between Kiir and Machar originate from 1991 event (Sørbø, 2014). Although Machar made an apology in public for his involvement in the Bor Massacre, Kiir has been citing the event to criticize him (Jok, 2014). Furthermore, Machar was appointed as the Vice President for the nation, expecting that he would convey his substantial constituency and power, both political and military to help in building a more unified state administration force (Rolandsen, et al, 2015).

In 2013, the sacking of Riek Machar (former Vice President) who was the leader of the Nuer community by South Sudanese President Salva Kiir acted as a catalyst between the Dinka and the Nuer leading to massive chaos and unrest, which led to death of thousands of people (Mamdani, 2016). The conflict was initially restricted to hostility between mutinous and loyal soldiers but it soon grew into a civilian massacre. After his sacking from government, Riek Machar marshalled support from an armed group of Nuer people and became their leader (Johnson, 2014). Consequently, war broke out between the Nuer and the Dinka, which triggered the civil war in the country. The South Sudanese defence forces played a key part in this skirmishes because it caused many deaths among the civilians.

Two opposing Sides

Currently, the South Sudan conflict involves two opposing side which are the SPLA and SPLM-IO. The SPLA serves as the country’s defence forces. The army was involved in fight for independence from Sudan. Since 2011, various segments of the SPLA were integrated into the national army (Sørbø, 2014). On the other hand, the SPLM-IO is composed of the rebel soldiers. It is also referred to as the anti-governmental forces (AGF) (Johnson, 2014). In 2013, the forces separated from the South Sudanese major political party, SPLM following political differences between Machar and Kiir. The political differences increased tensions between the army loyal to both leaders, which consequently plunged the nation into a South Sudanese Civil War (Mamdani, 2016).

Prior to conflict, South Sudan had a single political party, SPLM. However, there were constant internal power fights among its members, which worsened into an armed conflict. Various scholars suggest that mistrusts between the leaders of the party fuelled the suspicions (Knopf, 2016). In April 2013, President Kiir dismissed main party leaders in SPLM who seemed to be opposing him. The dismissed persons formed an opposition group (SPLM-IO) which blamed Kiir of office abuse. On the contrary, SPLM accused the SPLM-IO of planning to overthrow the government. In December of the same year, fighting emerged in capital Juba between the army allied to SPLM-IO and SPLM (Jok, 2014). The violence rapidly spread to other areas of the nation with the SPLM-IO and SPLM determined to control key areas such as Bentiu, Malakal and Bor. Moreover, the SPLM recruited more members from the Dinka group while the SPLM-IO influenced the Nuers to join it side. The ethnic card used by both opposing groups worsened the relationships between the Nuers and Dinkas (Mamdani, 2016). Significantly, the divisions between the two groups have been aggravated by the exceedingly challenging social and economic conditions in the nation, which have promoted the spread of fighting as people attempt to sustain their livelihood (Rolandsen, et al, 2015).

Leaders on each Side

Kiir and rebel head Riek Machar are the main opposing leaders in the South Sudan. Riek Machar leads the SPLM-IO, which opposes the South Sudanese government led by Salva Kiir (Jok, 2014). Machar often criticizes the government of runaway corruption, incompetence, poor governance and dictatorship. He soon left the country. On the other hand, Kiir is cautious of his former deputy ambitions and constant criticism. Both leaders have signed various peace deals in order to end violence but their forces have easily broken them leading to fresh violence (Sørbø, 2014). In 2015, they signed a peace agreement as the initial step to stop violence. In 2016, Machar returned to South Sudan where he assumed office as the vice president. Following his return, gunfire broke again between SPLA and SPLM-IO, displacing and killing many citizens yet again. Subsequently, the vice president fled the country for the second time but Taban Deng Gai replaced him (Johnson, 2014). The war has continued and each side is pointing an accusing finger for violating the peace agreement.

Each side Breakdowns

The SPLM-in-Opposition involves a heterogeneous military and political rebellion. The group is mainly composed of the Nuer ethnic group included its leaders and the foot soldiers who decamped from SPLA after differences between Kiir and Machar. Its commanders were previously members of Khartoum-aligned group, the South Sudan Defence Forces. The SSDF was fighting against the SPLA since 1991 (Mamdani, 2016). Similarly, they were supporting the Sudanese government in Khartoum. Most of the commanders defend or control the tribal interests of the Nuer community especially Shilluk forces led by Johnson Olony in the region of Upper Nile (De Waal, 2014). Moreover, other leaders of the SPLM-IO are determined to revenge and overthrow Salva Kiir from presidential office. The Nuer community is the second biggest ethnic organization in the country (Sørbø, 2014). The SPLM-IO also fights to against Dinka domination in South Sudan government. On the other hand, the SPLA is the government forces but is mainly composed of the Dinka community. It also includes other small ethnic groups in the country (Rolandsen, et al, 2015).

Key Issues of each Side

The SPLA and SPLM-IO are fighting to control political power, which would benefit them to manage the nation’s strategic resources such as national oil, minerals and water. The two opposing side also accuse each other of disrespecting the peace agreement which would had led to a ceasefire. Other key issues include poor social services, corruption, dictatorship and tribalism (Mamdani, 2016). Moreover, the issue of demilitarisation of capital city the two groups’ remains an obstacle because SPLA has objected any attempt to withdraw its troops from Juba. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is taking the mediatory role and has initiated a peace deal, which compel both sides to withdraw their armed forces from the capital city Juba (Jok, 2014). Initially, Riek Machar forces were allowed to stay in the capital but the government has been adamant of withdrawing. Another cause of concern is the power sharing between the opposition and the government. The SPLM led by Kiir demand to hold 70 per cent of government while the SPLM-IO intends to get 40 percent share (Johnson, 2014). The opposition also want to control areas such as Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity but the government has refused such as move. Consequently, these issues remain the cause of repeated cycle of fighting in the country (Johnson, 2014).

Identity-based Theories and Resource Mobilization Theories

Both resource-mobilization and identity-based theories suggest that social movement encompasses competition between structured organizations with independent relationship and complex types of communication (Pinaud, 2014). In addition, both theories contend that conflictual cooperative action is common and contestants are normally well-integrated and rational members of various groups (Cohen, 1985). In conclusion, collective action comprises a type of association particular to the setting of the current multicultural civil society.

Resource-mobilization theory disapproves the focus on grievances and feeling. It also disapproves the idea that atomized people inspired by social strain are the major stakeholders in social undertaking (Cohen, 1985). Therefore, the theory implies that for a group of people to mobilize shared action, they require complex structural and communications modes, which move beyond the basic mechanism. It also pays close attention on the strategies, opportunities, resources, interests and organization to provide for a wide-scale mobilization. Moreover, it recommends that social movement should be taken as conflict structure of shared action (Cohen, 1985). Secondly, it submits that there is no substantial difference between non-institutional and institutional collective action. Finally, the collective action encompasses the logical search for group interests and formal, bureaucratic, and large-scale organizations are involved (De Waal, 2014).

On the other hand, the identity-based theory proposes that combined actors attempt to establish a cluster identity within the society whose interpretation they compete. It becomes a source of conflict because it is very restrictive from within the group. Identity-based theory encourages people to pursue cultural goals in the society (Knopf, 2016). For instance, in Australian government enacted the White Australia policy which expressed the country’s inclination to preserve itself as a British and white nation. The policy influenced most of the country’s immigration laws even after it was abolished in 1973 (Tavan, 2004). In addition, such as move was aimed at maintaining the identity of the Australian people. In the South Sudan conflict, the ethnic groups’ differences have been influenced by the need to promote the cultural identities. Therefore, the Nuer rejects the idea of domination from the other ethnic groups such as the Dinkas. For this reason, they have been fighting to retain their cultural identity (Rolandsen, 2015). The tribal clashes are encouraged by the need to protect their identity through political power.

The Organization of each Side

The SPLM-IO is headed by Riek Machar who is its military and political leader. Peter Yaak is the deputy military commander to Machar. The organization operates as both as a militia and party. It normally uses guerrilla tactics mainly targeting the government forces and civilians especially the Dinka ethnic group (Mamdani, 2016). Military commanders who previously part of the government forces and declared loyalty to Riek also lead the SPLM-IO (Johnson, 2014). In addition, the soldiers who belonged to Nuer White Army also part of the forces in the Greater Upper Nile. Finally, the deputy commanders are composed of former government detainees who were thought to be planning a coup. However, reports indicate that it does not have a well-organized membership or organizational structure. On the other hand, the SPLMA is the South Sudan government forces (Sørbø, 2014). The Chief of General Staff (COGS) who is the commander of all forces heads its organizational structure. Moreover, the COGS supervise five directorates, which are headed by various deputies of chief of general staff (DCOGS). The five directorates include Training and Research, Political and Moral Orientation, Logistics, Operations and Administration. The SPLA also has various divisions, which are divided based on regions such as Jonglei State, Upper Nile State among others. The army also has air force wing, which is stationed in Juba (Johnson, 2014).

Additional Powers each Side Has

Both sides have additional powers as they seek to control the political power in South Sudan. Firstly, the SPLA led by Salva Kiir controls large part of the country’s resources. It has more than 210, 000 soldiers who are subdivided into groups of 10,000 service men (Mamdani, 2016). The group also has air force although it is small. The SPLA benefits from government supplies and well-organized training and operations as compared to the SPLM-IO. SPLA want to control more oil-rich fields such as in Unity State. On the other hand, Machar controls the states of Jonglei state, Unity States and the Upper Nile, which are rich in oil (De Waal, 2014). His political influence in these states has enabled him to employ civilian governors of Jonglei and the Upper Nile. The governors act as the main mobilizers of Nuer people and military commander in the states. Moreover, they facilitate good relationship between informal military, formal military and political aspects of the SLM-IO in the state (Sørbø, 2014). In the Unity State, Machar has not appointed a governor but has retained the one who defected from government to the opposition.

Side that Represent the Status Quo

The South Sudan conflict between the SPLM-IO and SPLA represents a constant cycle of violence. Although neither side want the status quo to remain, the government side seems to be more aligned to the existing state of affairs (Rolandsen, 2015). Reports has indicated that the presidency concentrate most of the constitutional power which makes it challenging to achieve major transformation in the country. President Kiir is determined to cling to power which acts as an obstacle to the peace process. The SPLA has maintained it demands to control 70 percent of the government against IGAD proposal of 53 percent. The SPLM government has also been accused of creating tribal states, which encourages fights between different ethnics over border (Mamdani, 2016).

How Structure of Government Affect each Side

In south Sudan, the president is the head of state and government. The South Sudan Constitution empowered the president with more power such as firing elected governors in the nation’s ten states. Moreover, he has the authority to select members of parliament he desires. He also compelled the army commanders to retire against their wish (Rolandsen, 2015). The office of the president also determines the date of election, which has not been conducted since independence in 2011. Moreover, the president is blamed for protecting corrupt government officials especially the ministers (Pinaud, 2014). Foucault theory of power suggests that individuals in power should strive to empower the institutions instead of concentrating power to a single entity or individual. In so doing, those institutions would have the power to operate smoothly. In addition, he noted that principles of control and order appear to devolve power (Grosz, 1990). Therefore, South Sudan government tend to concentrate power to a single institution, which often lead to violence.

Conclusion and Recommendation

In order to end escalating violence in South Sudan, conflicting parties should be determined to stop hostilities and order allied forces for a ceasefire. The SPLM government should accept an all-inclusive government, which provides settlement for all involved parties, set dates for new general election and initiate constitutional review process. In addition, the government should guarantee freedom, security and safety of the civilians (Rolandsen, 2015). In addition, it should respect the neutrality and independence of the humanitarian groups. In addition, the government should be committed to implementation of peace agreement. For long-term solution to the crisis, the government should begin a national dialogue as well as justice and reconciliation among all parties (Johnson, 2014). Furthermore, the national army should be restructured and reformed. Initially, the public service system should be reformed.

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