Skepticism about perceptual knowledge

The paper discusses skepticism about perceptual knowledge. Toward this end, I will first explain the problem of uncertainty about perceptual knowledge. Then, I will clarify the two most important solutions for the problem. After that, I will compare the two solutions with the ones presented by Descartes and Moore on the subject. Finally, I will critically and thoughtfully evaluate the solutions while providing my assessment of them.

Defence of the Basic Argument for Skepticism

The primary argument for skepticism offers two options. The first is that if a person is aware of being in class, then that person has real evidence to rule that he or she is in the matrix. The second option is that the evidence may not be adequate for ruling out that the person is in the matrix. Therefore, a person should accept the conclusion that he or she is not in class. The problem of skepticism about perpetual knowledge is that it presents a complex way of understanding the validity of an argument. Considering that the argument is valid, then, the only method for rejecting the conclusion is by looking for a reason that is sufficient to dismiss the premise. Here, there are two solutions (Premise 1 and Premise 2). Premise 1 accepts the evidence, while Premise 2 rejects the evidence as insufficient to make the argument valid.

Proposition 1 requires that when evaluating the primary argument for skepticism, a person should evaluate if it is valid and whether the decision is sound. A valid argument is one supported by the evidence, and the evidence is sufficient enough to give a ruling of the person in the matrix. It means that one is in control of a particular thought or situation (Grau 196). In this case, being in class is a valid argument, and the evidence of presence is good enough to rule out that the person is in the matrix. The validity guarantees the truth of the conclusion and the only method of rejecting the conclusion is by looking for a just basis to dismiss the premise (Premise 1). A sound conclusion is that one knows and accepts to be in the matrix. Therefore, Premise 1 is sound. Accepting premise 1 means that knowledge is a basic requirement for establishing the validity and soundness of an argument. The knowledge must have sufficient evidence to rule out all other alternatives.

Premise 2 says that the proof of an argument is not sufficient to make the ruling that a person is in the matrix, also known as the brain in a vat (Chalmers 1). The argument is explainable using the Matrix Case that the evidence from perceptual experiences will remain the same even when a person is in the matrix. As Chalmers (1) says, the brain will view things similarly from one person to another. Holding this premise means that the evidence in premise 1 is not sufficient to make a ruling over the alternatives. Premise 2 allows options for consideration, and if the evidence is not adequate, then the person cannot claim the argument is valid. In this case, premise two will hold that only knowing is insufficient evidence to rule out the argument as valid against other alternatives, thereby rejecting premise 1. Accepting the conclusion will mean that one does not know whether it is in class. In this case, the person is regarded as a radical skeptic.

Criticisms of the Basic Argument for Skepticism

Descartes’ response to skepticism criticizes premise 2, which insists that the evidence is insufficient to argue that one is in the matrix. To defeat premise 2, it requires revealing that the evidence has the capability of ruling out that one is in the matrix, and Descartes, in his response, aimed at achieving that. Descartes used the example of believing in God to explain perceptual knowledge. We know about God as existing and infinite (Grau 198), and that God cannot deceive us and if people believe otherwise, then, their perceptual experiences would be unreliable. Since God is a perfect being with whom we believe, then the perceptual experiences of people are reliable. Hence, rejecting premise 2 and assuming that knowledge of something is adequate evidence to rule out alternatives.

Moore’s response to skepticism relates to the premise 1 that having knowledge is sufficient evidence to decide that one is in a matrix. It means that to defeat proposition 1, a person needs to show that they have knowledge of something, even if the evidence is not satisfactory, to rule out that they are in the matrix. In his example, Moore uses the real hand's method to explain perpetual beliefs (Moore 197). Such ideas are comparable to skeptical arguments of knowledge that need to rule out alternatives. Given choices, a person should select what is more certain, and the burden of proof is a skeptic. Therefore, premise 1 is rejected and assumes that there is no need for knowledge in ruling out an alternative in particular cases.

Evaluation

Looking at the response for Descartes, I reject premise 2 since its argument lacks justification. As a person, I cannot think of what I don’t believe. I support Descartes's response to the perpetual belief that there is an external world that exists and has an accurate representation of my continuous experiences. Believing in God as a perfect and infinite being is a constant belief in the external world and is well represented in my perceptual experiences. In this case, if I don’t believe in God, then I will be deceiving my perceptual knowledge.

Works Cited

Chalmers, David, The Matrix as Metaphysics, In Grau, Christopher, Philosophers Explore the Matrix, 2005, Oxford University Press, The Web (http://consc.net/papers/matrix.html)

Grau, Christopher, Bad Dreams, Evil Demons, and the Experience Machine: Philosophy and The Matrix, 2005, Oxford University Press.

Moore, G.E, Proof of an External World, In Moore, G.E., Philosophical Papers, 1962:144-148.