Mental Illness and Death Penalty

For a long time, the society have ignored  mental illness. On one side, for a majority of the common people, mental disorder is something to fear. The primitive narrative that mental illness is caused by control of  evil spirits finds its expression in the modern day in the embraced wisdom that mentally ill people are distinct from others and are to be avoided by all means (Farina et al 1996). On the other hand, the society has long pitied people afflicted with mental disorders, as seen by the existence of special defenses exempting such individuals from criminal duties and also by the consistent campaigns to improved mental health treatment facilities. Unlike in other cases, this ignorance is dramatically exemplified in cases involving the death penalty. Mental disability is explicitly known as a vindicating factor in a majority of death sentence decrees and the Supreme Court has determined in Ford v. Wainwright, that under the eighth amendment it is unusual and a cruel punishment to execute an individual whose mental state makes impossible the understanding of the capital punishment. In spite of that a considerable percentage of death row inmates are mentally disabled, and evidence indicates that psychological disorder is often, actually if not statutory, an intensifying element as far as death punishment bodies are concerned.

This paper will hence outline a few rationales why death punishment, even though commonly a justified exercise by the state conviction, should hardly or even never be inflicted on people with mental disabilities. The first argument is the fact that the executing persons who are mentally ill is a violation of equal protection of the laws in states that do not allow the execution of children, or at least in the states that do not allow the execution of people with mental disorders (Hertz, & Weisberg, 1981). The second reason is based on the assumption that executing people with mental illness is statutory as a universal plan, but depends on the claim that capital punishment magistrate often perceive mental disorders as an intensifying factor, based on the assertion, the hulk of death penalties inflicted on inmate with mental disorders are a dispossession of life without the due process of law. The other reason presumes that a legit capital punishment has been inflicted, but exemplifies why a majority of persons with mental issues on death punishments ought to be exempted either due to their incompetence under Ford

or because their competence is sustained through a medical imposition that is unconstitutional.

The Equal Protection Argument

In pursuit of the decision of the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma,  it is unlawful to kill a person for an offense done while below the age of 16. In any case, there is no state that explicitly allows for the execution of such a minor. The federal government in addition to the other twelve states do not allow people with mental retardation to be executed (Keyes, & Edwards, 1997). The prohibitions are basically grounded on the view of liability of the committed felony, exists individualistically of the eighth amendment bar, acknowledged in Ford, that prevents the execution of an incompetent individual at the chosen period execution. In high contradiction to the protection granted to the execution of minors and those with mental retardation, there is not even one state that interdicts the imposition of a death punishment on a person afflicted with a mental disorder during the offense (Hazard & Louisell, 1962). The injunction of the 14th amendment that calls for equal protection under the law breached by the disparity in dealing since there exists no valid motive for it; even though there are some psychological differences between the mentally ill and those with mental retardation, legally there are no significant differences between the two categories of people, or between them and minors (Billotte, 1994). Therefore, any state that fails to treat equally the three categories of people with regard suitability for execution is unconstitutional.

The argument for such an claims necessitates, first face the decision of the Supreme Court in Heller V. Doe, that proposed that there is no valid reason need by the state to discriminate between those with mental retardation and those with mental illness. In Heller, a majority of five members of the panel decided that the paradigm of evidence and the protocol for the obligation of those suffering from mental illness, as long as there is a rational basis held by the state for the differences. As it has been made precise by the other in different judgments, a logical basis only exist when the state can progress a logical distinguishable legislative goal, for the supposed inequality, which implies that any reasonable argument will suit.

Although logic assessment with bite is the appropriate criterion for examining the capital punishment as it is applicable to the three categories in discussion here, good reason for any discrimination between them would overwhelm a challenge of equal protection. Supposedly, mental retardation can easily be diagnosed as compared to mental illness which is highly debatable. Although we may consent the view that psychological disability cannot be justified as easily as mental retardation, the assertion at its best clarifies the decision of a state to ascertain varying amounts of evidence for both groups. It, however, does not give reason why people who explicitly suffer from mental disorders are worth more of execution as compared to those with mental retardation (Bonta, Law, & Hanson, 1998). The claims that those with mental disease are more probable to be responsible for their situation during the crime and have greater chances as compared to youth or persons with mental obstruction to differentiate between right and wrong more openly face the comparative responsibility and better ability concerns that ought to be the center of equal protection assessment.

The Due Process Argument

When the state does not follow its own laws it clear that the due process of the law is lacking. If different from the law in each capital punishment state, mental disorder is perceived as a provoking element in the determination of death punishment, a deliberate violation of the due process has taken place. For some reasons the reception of this stance could be the origin for a ban on all death penalties for people with mental illness; at least, a number of them would be invalidated. Every state capital punishment act, whether covertly or overtly, requires that during the offense mental illness be perceived as a probable mitigating circumstance (Berkman, 1989). The position, however, is nearly certainly endorsed constitutionally after Lockett v. Ohio.  The Supreme Court, in this case, said that the Eighth and the Fourteenth amendments necessitates the judge, it each but the oddest form of capital case, not be excluded from factoring in, as an aggravating situation, any features of the offender’s charm and any of the situations of the crime that the offender submits as the core for a sentence less than execution (Baldus, Woodworth, & Pulaski, 1990).

Approximately two-thirds of state capital punishment laws overtly include more than one of the moderating factors included in the Model Penal Code, that outlines, inter alia; (1) whether the culprit suffered from ‘severe psychological or emotional condition’ during the time of the crime (2) whether the offender’s capacity of realize the how bad his behavior is or to correspond his action to the necessities of the law was marred due to his mental condition or weakness or intemperance; and (3) whether ‘ the crime was undertaken under conditions which the offender perceives to offer a moral validation or mitigation of his action.’ The first reason mirrors the incitement verbalisation of the Code for decreasing murder to manslaughter, excluding the rationality qualification. The other reason utilizes the irrationality defense dialectal of the Code, although with the omission of mental illness or imperfection ground and the prerequisite that inability be ‘significant’. In the last reason, there is a total idiosyncratic scrutiny of the culprit’s intentions. Precisely, the aggravating influence allowed to mental inability under capital punishment laws is open, not even necessitating a proof of mental disease as explained in this paper.

However, study on the character of capital sentencing bodies indicates that adjudicators and magistrates habitually regard proof of mental illness in simply the contrary way (Egelko, 1998). A study conducted in California for one year, that analyzed 238 major cases to establish the reasons that impacted verdicts about capital sentencing, realized that unsuccessfully raising an insanity defense positively correlates with death punishment (Goodpaster, 1983). Another study conducted in Georgia involving 128 cases also suggests that there is a strong correlation between failed claims of an insanity defense and a death penalty; actually, an unsuccessful insanity defense is was among the most correct predictors of the person to receive a death sentence.

Even though some courts agree that even the legit aggravating situation may fail to establish the grounds for a death penalty whether it was ‘influenced’ by a mental disease. For example in Huckaby V. State,  the Florida Supreme Court overturned a capital sentence since the most crucial mitigating factor- the wrongfulness of the defendant’s offense –was ‘ the explicit result of his mental disorder.’ After two years, in Miller v. State, this particular court overturned a death penalty inflicted by a magistrate who validated his ruling on the basis that the offender was dangerous due to his mental condition (Ellsworth, et al., 1984). The court indicated that dangerous was not acknowledged as a facilitating factor in Florida’s death punishment act and further stated that the trial of judge’s apply the offender’s mental condition, and his subsequent tendency to act violently, as an augmenting influence in favor of the infliction of the death punishment looks contradictory to the legal intention as prescribed in the law. Forwarded to its reasonable end, the cases are likely to make the infliction of a death sentence on an individual with mental illness difficult, because a majority of aggravating situations can often be drawn to the mental status of the offender (Zimring, 2004). The results would as well lead to an important feasible advantage. The defense lawyers would no longer be subjected to Hobson’s option of whether or not to provide proof of mental disease and jeopardize verifying the case of prosecution in provocation or rather renounce from providing evidence of that kind when it may be the only available mitigating evidence.

The Eighth Amendment Argument

Ford v. Wainright’s states that the eighth amendment prohibits the imposition of a death penalty on an incompetent person left two very important concerns without answers; What is the basis of the competency qualification, and what entails the competency standard? The answer to the second questions is determined by the response provided for the first question. If the most reasonable basis for competency qualification is the interest of the society in revenge, then the measure of explaining competency to be killed is not low as suggested before, and a such a good number of people with mental illnesses today do not meet the threshold (Cwinya-ai, 2009).

The Supreme Court in the case of Ford,  outlined same six reasons drawn from the common law extending back to the barbaric days, why an individual ought to be competent before execution; (1) a person who is incompetent might not be able to offer guidance with the last minute details leading to the break of the penalty; (2) craziness itself is an enough punishment; (3) it’s difficult for an inept person to make peace with God; (4) executing a person who is incompetent provides no deterrent impact on the society; (5) executing an incompetent person is miserable, inhumane and cruel; and (6) the execution of an incompetent person cannot realize the vengeance intended by the punishment. The court however evaded on concluding  any of the reasons to be the primary or just the background for its judgement, merely stating that whether the goal is to secure the convicted from anxiety and agony with no cosiness of understanding or guard the society’s honor from the primitivity of extorting mindless punishment, the prohibition ganners support in the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits ruthless and uncommon punishment (Hall, 2001). The view of the majority was even less obliging on the standard of competence. It actually proffered no test. Nonetheless, Justice Powell, in agreement, argued that he ‘would suggest that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the capital punishment only for people who are unaware of the punishment they are supposed to face and the reason they should be subjected to it (Liebman, & Shephard, 1977). Since in the present time only the retributive rationale is sensible, the argument by Justice Powell is the appropriate one, so long there is the use of the term ‘unaware’ which in Powell’s test is supposed to imply insufficient emotional understanding. Their rest of the rationales are full of flaws. For example, as noted by Justice Powell, the idea that competency is supposed to help the lawyer ‘ has little worth in the present world’. This is because the offender has a right to operative help of counsel at trial and appeal, and also a series of post-conviction analysis of the sentence (Steiker, & Steiker, 1995). Also, just as executing an incompetent person is a cruel act, it is even more cruel to execute a person who is aware that is going to die. According to commentators who have given themselves to analyze the various rationales for competency qualification concur that the interest of the society in making sure the defendant suffers in equal measures to their offense is the most appropriate conventional centre for the competency prerequisite.

Reforms in the Justice system  and Prisons for the Mentally Ill

People suffering from serious mental disorders are in the jails are ten times more than those in the psychiatric hospitals and their treatment in jails include victimization, insufficient mental health care and usually long stays in solitary confinements which makes them even more disturbed and dysfunctional after they are released, (Arrigo, 2012). As such reforms are necessary in various areas in order to improve the plight of inmates with mental illnesses.

One of the ways of reducing controlling the number of people with mental disorders in our prisons is by diversion or re-direction. Usually, a mental health court is turned into a locus for arbitrating offenses done by people with mental illness (White, 1987). The judges provide the substance abusing offenders a chance to take part in mental health treatment or a recovery program in the community, if the attendance of the victim is successful the judge, the defense lawyer and the prosecutor in agreement, will not sentence the offender into any form of punishment.

Bail reform another crucial thing. Presently, in a majority of jurisdictions, a magistrate grant bails for offenders charged with offenses. The judge will reject bail in case the offender is perceived as dangerous or an escape risk; although such cases are relatively few, averagely, if the offender has the ability to raise the amount of money for the bail they will be allowed to wait for trial out of jail. Those that can raise the bail money are released and those who cannot remain in jail awaiting their trials. Obviously, among those made to remain in jail are those with mental disorders. Campaigns for bail reforms that are holding control in a number of state legislatures, would put an end to the means test for bail. All offenders should be granted or denied bail on a similar basis, without discrimination.

References

Arrigo, B. A. (2012). Punishing the mentally ill: A critical analysis of law and psychiatry. SUNY Press.

Baldus, D. C., Woodworth, G., & Pulaski, C. A. (1990). Equal justice and the death penalty: A legal and empirical analysis. Upne.

Billotte, J. M. (1994). Is It Justified-The Death Penalty and Mental Retardation. Notre Dame JL Ethics &           Pub. Pol’y, 8, 333.

Berkman, E. F. (1989). Mental illness as an aggravating circumstance in capital sentencing. Colum. L.    Rev., 89, 291.

Bonta, J., Law, M., & Hanson, K. (1998). The prediction of criminal and violent recidivism among mentally disordered offenders: a meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 123(2), 123.

Cwinya-ai, R. O. (2009). Death Penalty of the Mentally Ill-The Attitude of the Courts in the United States    on the Legal, Ethical and Moral Question of its Administration.

Egelko, B. (1998). Federal Court Blocks Killer’s Execution: New Hearing Ordered on Right to             Appeal. Orange CountyPress, June, 10.

Ellsworth, P. C., Bukaty, R. M., Cowan, C. L., & Thompson, W. C. (1984). The death-qualified jury and            the defense of insanity. Law and Human Behavior, 8(1-2), 81.

Farina, A., Holland, C. H., & Ring, K. (1966). Role of stigma and set in interpersonal interaction. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 71(6), 421.

Goodpaster, G. (1983). The trial for life: Effective assistance of counsel in death penalty cases. NYUL     Rev., 58, 299.

Hall, T. S. (2001). Legal fictions and moral reasoning: Capital punishment and the mentally retarded defendant after Penry v. Johnson. Akron L. Rev.

Hazard Jr, G. C., & Louisell, D. W. (1962). Death, the state, and the Insane: Stay of execution. UCLA l.            reV., 9, 381.

Hertz, R., & Weisberg, R. (1981). In mitigation of the penalty of death: Lockett v. Ohio and the capital  defendant’s right to consideration of mitigating circumstances. Cal. L. Rev., 69, 317.

Keyes, D. W., & Edwards, W. J. (1997). Mental retardation and the death penalty: Current status of         exemption legislation. Mental and physical disability law reporter, 21(5), 687-696.

Liebman, J. S., & Shephard, M. J. (1977). Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the Boiler Plate:      Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor. Geo. LJ, 66, 757.

Steiker, C. S., & Steiker, J. M. (1995). Sober second thoughts: Reflections on two decades of constitutional   regulation of capital punishment. Harvard Law Review, 109(2).

V. Wainwright, F. (1982). 477 US 399 (1986). Id at, 422.

White, L. T. (1987). The mental illness defense in the capital penalty hearing. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 5(4), 411-421.

Zimring, F. E. (2004). The contradictions of American capital punishment. Oxford University Press

487 U.S. 815 (1988)