Hypothesis Ranking

During the Taiwan presidential election, tensions appear to be rising between the Taiwan administration and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The two traditional presidential candidates are the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). Shu Chiang is the candidate for the Taiwan Solidarity Union. Chiang expresses a desire for independence in his address, challenging the PRC’s Anti-Cessation Law of 1996. This law empowers the PRC to use non-peaceful tactics to counter the Taiwan independence movement. Furthermore, the PRC regards Taiwan’s sovereignty as one of its own. As the elections approach, there has been widespread worry about Chiang’s political practices.  The Communist Party of China (CPU) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have showcased an increase in sensitivity towards Chiang. There exist three hypotheses to a future course-of-action by the People’s Republic of China. These assumptions include:

H1: Through an intensive diplomatic solution, Taiwan and the Party of China can eliminate tensions.

H2: The People’s Republic of China can only influence the results of the election through the use of intimidation tactics and limited military intervention.

H3: Through the use of full-scale and direct military action, the People’s Liberation Army can conquer and occupy Taiwan.

Section II: Outcome Assessed to Be the Most Likely to Occur: Direct Attack

According to information from researchers, it is evident that direct military attack and limited military intervention occurred. However, substantial intelligence gaps, course-of-action, use of full-scale and direct military action significantly contributed to the probability of a direct attack. The evidence can be grouped into different categories. For instance, evidence 1a is People’s Republic of China actions that are consistent with procedures for a direct attack. These procedures were by land invasion. An image from an unknown source seems to reveal a series of events that occurred before the election. The imagery showcased Zhangzhou, and Whenzhoun naval ports have several amphibious assaults squadrons in the early phase of loading supplies. However, evidence 1a contrasts with the former People’s Republic of China reactions. These responses were by Taiwan officials towards independence.

Earlier on China utilized intimidation through threats of military actions and missile launches. It is therefore evident that evidence 1a showcases the in-progress military training exercise. However, before the revelation of proof 1a the announcements of training exercises were regarded to be irrelevant. Evidence 1a seems to support direct attack scenario.

Another departure from past actions taken by the People’s Republic of China towards Taiwanese elections is showcased by evident 2a. Apparent 2a liaises with hypothesis H3. 20 days before the election, information from unknown source reveals much on the happenings that transpired. According to the information gathered, an undetermined number of PLA B-6 bomber aircraft are loading ammunitions and ordnance at Luqioa. Evidence 2a seems to create significant intelligence gaps. These information gaps are vital in the making of diagnostic value in accordance to the reliability of the source. However, evidence 2b seems to challenge evidence 1a due to the number of days before the election, 45 days. A video by a Chinese state media showcases a bomber craft driving international renegade services with chemical and short-tempered ordnance on an unknown date. Therefore, evidence 2a can be used to reveal the time of attacks by use of the bomber aircraft.

The supporting evidence as provided in this case of evidence 2a would have been termed to be false when more probability is accorded to hypothesis H3. Another limitation would be of the intentions and competences suggested. If the People’s Republic of China had a purpose of performing an attack using the B-6 bomber aircraft, then evidence 2a would have revealed the intention and capabilities unintentionally.

Evidence 3a illustrates on the move of the United States Air Force. This is showcased by their flights having confirmed that the 96th missile regiment in Nanping is preparing launch systems for firing. These happenings take place 20 days before the election. Use of the weapons would serve as an act of intimidation or a form of direct attack against Taiwan. However, evidence 3a states that during the 1996elections, rockets were fired into the Taiwan Strait but did not reach Taiwan’s mainland. The People’s Republic of China did not indicate their intentions towards this act. However, an assumption could be made in regards to the announcements made by China of their capabilities to Taiwan. These capabilities announced by the People’s Republic of China are supported by hypothesis H2 and the use of intimidation tactics. These acts seem not to have an adverse impact as the missile systems may be nothing more than a ruse of tricking the analysis of their previous actions.

There exists a relationship between hypothesis H3, evidence 1a, and evidence 2a. Both are regarded to be timely, credible and from a legitimate source. Different attempts were initiated in accordance to the various hypotheses. For instance, various unknowns in hypothesis H3 tend to hide the intended course-of-action of the People’s Republic of China. All these attempts are made to conceal what types of supplies PLA forces were using and preparing. The People’s Republic of China is forced to use a D&D campaign so as to avoid unnecessary attention and pressure from the global pact. This is a probability of the B-6 bomber aircraft being loaded with chemical or nuclear ammunitions. However, there were fears of the international community denouncing the course-of-action.

Section III-Second Most Likely to Occur: Limited Intervention

Hypothesis H2 initiates a reliable non-controlled information. The reliable non-controlled information (RNCI) seems only to be relevant if the enemy is not aware or is unlikely to notice of the further use of information of his future behavior. The similarity from hypothesis H2 and hypothesis H3 showcase a full argument of the reliable non-controlled information. However, hypothesis H2 is a recommended suggestion to use because it is satisfying. According to the unknown sources, evidence 1a would have been a considered information from RNCI source. This is because of similarity in arguments. According to the reports made by the United States PACOM, a minimum of 45 aircraft, fighter Regiment patrols in the Strait of Taiwan increased by a 50% margin. This was 20 days before the elections.

The fighter aircraft were used for specific purposes. They were used to enforce a designated no-fly zone and also to disable the Taiwanese air defense systems. A lot seemed to have happened during the course-of-action as characterized by military operations.

Evidence 1b is dated 30 days before the election. A series of events occurred during this time. For instance, the PLA’s activities are evident during this course-of-action. The People’s Liberation Army issued mobilization orders to an unknown number of PLAF fighter regiments. This occurred at the Nanjing district, which shares the shore with Taiwan Strait. Later on, an increase in the number of patrolling fighter aircraft followed. This increase is linked to the mobilization orders offered or as a result of capabilities demonstrations thus supporting hypothesis H3. Evidence 2a appears to be consistent with hypothesis H2 as the state news are controlled by the information source. Evidence 2a indicates that Xinhua state news has announced the test of several CSS-6 missiles in the Strait of Taiwan, 20 days before the election. This would be conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Consistency is evident between hypothesis H2 and evidence 2b. According to a report made by the United States STRATCOM, 99th, and 98th missile regiments. These regiments were experienced in Luciao and Leaning respectively. The two missiles were successfully test fired into Central China, 40 days before the election. According to People’s Liberation Army spokesman, the test firings were pre-planned tests of system reliability. From this incidence, it became evident that the military tests from evidence 2a are also safety test. Moreover, the military test can be regarded to be part of People’s Republic of China intentions display.

According to the NSA, Zhangzhou, Whenzhou and subs at Canton, a preparation of an extended operation seems to have been planned. This follows reports of two PLAN anti-ships subs that have left their unknown current location. These happenings are dated 40-45 days before the elections.

Section IV - Least Likely to Occur: Diplomatic Tension Elimination

There exists new evidence that supports hypothesis H1 that seems to relate with hypothesis H2 and H3 hypotheses. However, hypothesis H1 is regarded to be unlikely among the other assumptions. The People’s Republic of China seems to recognize the benefits of a diplomatic relation. Different personalities have supported the move of potential benefit to a diplomatic solution. Examples of political leaders who have supported this movement are General Ban Ki-Moon (Secretary of the United Nations) and Hu Jianto.

These appeals for intervention made appear to be sincere thus making evidence 1a consistent. This consistency is also regarded to be of a diplomatic resolution. The activities of People’s Liberation Army are presented in hypotheses H2 and H3. However, there exist direct contradictions to evidence 1a as Jianto seems to stale the situation.

Evidence 2a prevents the occurrence of war by dispatching two carrier battle groups to Taiwan straits. These carriers provided for a buffer of sorts between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China, fostering a polite discussion. The tension experienced was as a result of the anti-ships subs been deployed. A diplomatic relation was witnessed when the United States president was given an explanation of the Taiwan’s situation. President Obama seemed not to support Taiwan on their current move. It became evident that the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan cannot depend on the United States for resources to a diplomatic solution.

However, conflict resolution through diplomatic means would have significantly benefited People’s Republic China. For instance, it would have increased their stand with the United Nations and also promote their relation with the international community. This would make the People’s Republic of China be a non-confrontational global power thus making the nation a decisive political win.

Bibliography

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Ho, Connie Suk-Han, David Wai-Ock Chan, Suk-Man Tsang, and Suk-Han Lee. “The cognitive profile and multiple-deficit hypothesis in Chinese developmental dyslexia.” Developmental Psychology 38, no. 4 (2002): 543.