Davidson’s Programme for the Philosophy of Language

Donald Davidson has made substantial contributions to the philosophy of language throughout the preceding decades. Yet, there are only a few studies that explain his works. His works use language that exposes specifics and provides a comprehensive examination of philosophy while being composed of organic that supports the achievement of sense of a particular notion (Lepore, Ernest, and Kirk 309). The majority of his research has been on the philosophy of language and the comprehension of truth, which are presented in theoretical but analytical formats. This paper explains Davidson’s program in the context of how it enables understanding of the nature of meaning, the meaning of truths, arguments in favor of and against his philosophy of meaning, and the prospects of Davidson’s Position in Light of Dummett’s criticism.

Davidson’s Program in the Philosophy of language

Davidson’s Philosophy of language states that one can understand the meaning of a person’s statements by assembling the meanings of the parts of the statement when they are assembled. It can be described as a set of axioms which allocate meanings to each element of a language that when put together in accordance to a particular rules of construction of expressions, enable creation of meaning (Yamada 9). Davidson also states that the idea of meaning is so flawed that there is no particular theory which can be used to explain it effectively. He states that the theory of language can be used as a substitute to the theory of meaning.

Davidson’s Program of nature of Meaning

The theory of meaning can be understood in the context of its compositional characteristics such as the perception that meaning exists in different parts such as logic which tells us how to express complex sentences in a logical manner. More specifically, the principle of meaning occurs in a subject-predicate form so that the reader of a sentence is able to understand the components of a complex sentence (Ernie, Lepore, and Ludwig 12). Meaning also occurs in the form of holism in which people connect sentences in accordance with the network of observations and experiences that are keyed to extensive association of inference to other sentences in that language. That is the expression of ideas in accordance with rules that connect them to other sentences which are familiar to the user. Holism in creating meaning is also achieved by connecting sentences extensively to other sentences by the use of approaches such as generalizations, abstractions and other forms of connectors. In order to acquire learnability and holism aspects of meaning, it is required that the theory pertaining to the construction of sentences should be adequate in so far as the implications involve the use of the right semantics at the sentences levels.

Davidson Understands of Meaning of Truth

Davidson’s program argues that an adequate meaning of language L can be given by providing an extensionally correct recursive understanding of the truth-in-L by providing a recursive interpretation of the truth in the language such that for each sentence in which L exists, there is a sentence ψ of a corresponding language such that the new sentence φ an outcome of a definition of true (Ramberg 16). The ability to achieve an adequate understanding of the definition of L is effective in understanding L. the goals that Davidson tries to achieve in the development of the definition of meaning is whether it can elucidate the determinant of a particular sentence and whether it explains the possibility of understanding and producing novel sentences. It does not account for the notion that to know a sentence’s meaning involves the understanding of the situations under which truth is expressed.

Davidson’s project is determined by the explanation of meaning in the context of truth. It has been suggested that truth is determined by recursive rules which explain the dependence of the complex expressions on their component elements. It states that truth does not necessarily need to appeal to semantic notions beyond the information being expressed (Malpas 17). This implies that truth theory should not be presented in interpretive manner since the act of fixing semantic values can result into violation of restrictions. However, if truth is non-interpretive, it is not possible to fix the components of the sentences, resulting into a challenge in satisfying Convention T. The limitation of the non-interpretive theory can be attributed to the action of Davidson’s abandonment of the project of illustrating an effective account of meaning, and making a conclusion that the theory of truth could be used as a replacement for the theory of meaning. In interpretive understanding of truth, semantic values are assigned to the primitive expressions such as terms which constitute the overall meaning.

Arguments for His Views and Criticisms Leveled against them

The arguments in favor of Davidson’s theory of meaning are its emphasis on learnability and the development of a theory from the concepts learned in order to acquire competence. It is also a holistic theory of meaning which implies that it can be used to understand meaning of a sentence composed of a number of elements (Lepore, Ernest, and Kirk 20). It includes an empirical bite which further reinforces its relevance and applicability in understanding the analytical procedure that can be followed to understand meaning. It also connects centrally and deeply withy the notions of the theory of mind by suggesting that meaning can be determined by a person’s interpretation of the concepts which exist in a particular combination of elements.

The criticism associated with Davidson’s program is that it only provides a theory of truth-in-L due to its limitation to specific languages and does not account for truth as the finding that semantic theory of Tarski as being a disquotational theory of truth and anything more substantial was not a requirement in semantics but may be a requirement in the development of a theory of knowledge. Davidson’s program is also associated with the limitation of limiting charity. It does not illustrate the effectiveness of the principle of charity in the nature of belief (Yamada 15). While the principle has some form of relevance, it is not understood whether the wholesale belief disagreement is possible. It has been argued that Davidson’s program is kind of a linguistic idealism that is anti-naturalist in relation to a language. There are factors which promote the perception that what constitutes truth which is determined by the domains of those sentences. A particular sentence may be used to imply an activity but it does not become true of the activity is not taking place. This argument is ignored by Davidson’s program. It has been argued that Davidson’s program cannot be easily understood unless the interpretive perspective is used as a technique of understanding meaning. This argument suggests that the concept of truth as an understanding of meaning is an interpretation after all. Davidson’s program has been criticized for not being able to fix the theory of truth and correct semantic values which it intended to correct (Ernie, Lepore, and Ludwig 5). When Davidson realized that extensional theory of truth would result into an inadequate understanding of meaning, he turned to a research that examined the role of an investigator in understanding a language based on the behavior of a speaker but nit the antecedent information pertaining to meaning. This approach has been perceived as one that creates constraint to the theory of meaning contrary to the objective of understanding meaning. According to Ramberg (8), the empirical constraint presented by Davidson’s program does not yield the objective of understanding meaning, but it represents an interpretation that is compatible with the project. It has been suggested that the inquiry by Davidson achieve irrelevance because of its failure at the stage of demonstrating the effect of a truth theory in fixing semantical values of the elements of meaning, thus failing to stipulate that the theory of meaning is interpretive, resulting into a less adequate aspect of his program.

Prospects of Davidson’s Position in Light of Dummett’s Criticism

According to Drummett, a theory of meaning provides an illustration of an experiment and its consequence. Drummett is critical of Davidson’s view because it presents an ascription of knowledge of meaning and belief regarding facts in a hypothetical manner. In addition, it criticizes Davidson’s point of view in the context of its denial of the reality of ’central aspect’ of understanding and the required conventions in the derivation of features from it. In case of the need for understanding the theory of meaning, it must be supplemented by an account of the understanding of the associated concept (Malpas 10). Drummett also criticizes Davidson’s program by stating that it puts more emphasis on language rather than thought. It accounts for the understanding of a concept using expressions in particular languages that defines the concept. The use of Davidson’s program as a theory of understanding meaning is based on the presupposition of the ability to understand another language. Drummett argues that knowledge of or understanding of a language involves employing the language in expressions such as communication (Lepore, Ernest, and Kirk 26). The ability to use an expression of a language involves the performance of numerous activities but it is possible to provide a particular account of the use by selecting a central aspect of understanding. In order to conceive meaning, one must understand its truth condition which is a central component of understanding a sentence. Drummett proposes that the role of truth theory of Davidson’s program can be achieved by deriving various features of truth-conditional conception features from a truth-condition. It also states that a theoretical hypothesis can be developed which enables ascription of a truth-condition that can be used by the speaker.

Conclusion

This paper explains the current understanding of the concept of meaning and truth according to Davidson’s program. According to Davidson’s program, meaning can be derived from the individual elements that constitute a sentence. Davidson also believes that meaning can be understood in the context of the level of truth related to a particular sentence. The criticisms that have been associated with Davidson’s program is its refutation of truth conditional semantics that are regarded as wrong since any sentence has a similar meaning as its meaning of truth. The objection provided by Drummett towards Davidson’s program is that it does not explain what the speaker has to know to get the right meaning of a sentence. Nevertheless, Davidson’s program provides an insight regarding the factors that need to be considered to understand a particular language.

Works Cited

Ernie, Lepore, and Ludwig Kirk. “Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality.” (2005).

Lepore, Ernest, and Kirk Ludwig. “Donald Davidson.” Midwest studies in philosophy 28.1 (2004): 309-333.

Malpas, Jeff E. Donald Davidson and the mirror of meaning: holism, truth, interpretation. CUP Archive, 1992.

Ramberg, Bjorn. “Donald Davidson: Philosophy of Language.” (1991).

Yamada, Takeshi. “On Dummett’s Critique of Davidsonian Theory of Meaning.” (2013).