A Divided Government as a Factor that Constrains Unilateral Decisions

Executive orders and divided government

Executive orders are strategic instruments constitutionally granted to a president to help find a way around the policy-making process. This paper explores a divided government as a factor that constrains unilateral decisions, the power of the presidency that serves in checks and balances on the legislature and judiciary.

The role of a divided government

A divided government is the main factor that constrains unilateral decisions made by the executive. The Congress can simply threaten to oppose the decision. For example, the president as the commander of the armed forces can send the troop to missions in a certain region, but the decision on military funding is solely for the legislature, who, when opposed to the decision, can delay funding (Bolton & Thrower, 2016). The president can, however, veto their decision but in a divided government, the Congress and the Senate can decide to override the veto by a two-thirds majority vote in both houses.

The executive branch as a check on the legislature and judiciary

The executive branch, however, has veto powers to approve a bill into law or deny it, adjourn or convene a congress and thus serves as a check on policy-making powers of the legislative arm of the government (Bolton & Thrower, 2016). Moreover, although the judiciary is also an independent arm of the government, the president appoints all federal judges.

Constraints on executive orders

During Obama’s regime, Republican lawmakers felt that his administration did not follow the law when it created programs that deterred deportation of immigrants, who were found with inadequate documentation (Masters, 2017). Here, the legislature acts as a constraint to a unilateral decision made by the executive.

Conclusion

Executive orders are not always a smooth ride and they are dependent on the constitutional provisions and the legislative capacity of the Congress. When a president has a congressional majority, he can create policies that will face little or no divergent ideologies.

References

Bolton, A., and Thrower, S. (2016). Legislative Capacity and the Executive Unilateralism. American Journals of Political Science, 60(3), 649-663.

Masters, J. (2017). The U.S. Foreign Policy Powers: Congress and President. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 29 March 2018, from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-foreign-policy-powers-congress-and-the-president